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I thank a reviewer of the article for helpful comments and Heidi Salaverría for inspiring
discussions. We share the overall interest, to reevaluate negatively evaluated
experiences. See her article “Vague Certainty, Violent Derealization, Imaginative
Doubting. Reflections on Common Sense and Critique in Peirce and Butler” in this
volume. 
1 Democracy is a way of life that depends on dealing with unease. Unease is a diffuse
negative sensation unlike articulated criticism of something or a rejection of something
with reasons. Unease can indicate problems and difficulties that cannot yet be named
as such or that cannot be expressed. Power relations may be at work as obstacles to
articulation.  Unease can be a feeling that has been imposed on certain groups that
cannot participate in the democratic public in the same way as others. But unease can
also be a form of dissatisfaction or fear of change. As such, unease can mobilize political
forces.  Uneasiness  has  very  different  manifestations  and  backgrounds  and  it  is  an
important theoretical challenge to analyze and better understand the structure and
varieties of unease. 
2 For feminist theories, which are usually committed to a critical self-understanding, the
feeling of unease related to gender relations is of great importance. Gender injustice
like  other  forms  of  social  injustice  takes  place  on  an  obvious  level  as  explicit
devaluations  and  exclusions,  but  also  on  an  implicit,  hardly  visible  and  only  very
diffusely felt level. The level of implicit injustice is in some ways the more difficult,
persistent,  tenacious  one  and  deserves  a  great  deal  of  attention.  This  is  the  case
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especially  in  our  times  and  in  the  Western  world,  which  is  characterized  by
comparatively extensive formal equality of the sexes. 
3 A closer examination of examples of diffuse unease help to point out the main features
of  this  sentiment.  Many examples  can  be  found in  feminist  literature,  such  as  the
underlying impression of not being taken seriously or a latent insecurity in one’s own
thinking and speaking because of  a  diffusely  felt  inadequacy or  obliqueness.  In  my
analysis, the following four features are characteristic: First, the sentiment of unease
has  a  negative-evaluative  component.  A  situation  is  perceived  as  oppressive  or
uncomfortable or out of tune. Second, it is an unstable, hesitating evaluation without
one’s being able to assign what the sources or causes are and to what extent oneself or
others are responsible. Third, this has to do with habitualized power asymmetries that
attack the epistemic authority of some. Fourth, the affective and the somatic are closely
connected and play a crucial role. 
4 In this paper I would like to focus on a double layer in the conception of unease that is
implied in the first and the third aspect. Unease is situational on the one hand and
habitual on the other. It is a way of perceiving the (negative) qualities of a situation.
But situations are always both singular as well as manifestations of more general habits
and  structures.  Habitualized  unease,  which  can  be  understood  as  something  like  a
frustration that has become a habit, but also as an internalization of inferiority, can
thus  be  easily  actualized  in  certain  situations.  Habitualized  unease  is  often  a
consequence of structural domination between sexes or racist  structures.  To unfold
this double layer, I choose a pragmatist frame of reference. Pragmatist philosophers
made  important  contributions  to  the  functional  role  of  habitualization  and  habits
(Peirce, James and Dewey) as well as to the concept of a situation and the grasping of
situations  through  their  qualities  (Dewey).  But  the  phenomenal  and  conceptual
complexity of unease needs more than these general concepts. They must be linked to
experiences  of  unease  and  ways  of  concrete  reflection  on  them.  Therefore,  it  is
systematically  necessary  to  include  theorists  that  offer  both  the  close  study  of
experiences of unease and a pragmatically informed conceptualization. Some of the
early pragmatist female thinkers and writers such as Charlotte Perkins Gilman turn out
to be a  rich source for  description and analysis.1 So there are both systematic  and
historical  reasons  to  study  the  female pragmatists  and  benefit  from their  insights.
Feminist  pragmatism enables to place experiences like unease at  the center and to
unfold it philosophically. But the pragmatist conceptual frame has to be enriched and
deepened  by  contributions  from  contemporary  feminist  theory  for  the  sake  of
understanding  this  widespread  but  hardly  ever  specifically  reflected  sentiment.
Important references for developing the features of unease are feminist Affect Studies,
e.g. the work of Sara Ahmed (2017), as well as concepts of embodiment, as in the work
of Iris  Marion Young (1980) or Beate Krais  (Dölling & Krais  2017),  who connects to
Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, or Miranda Fricker’s (2007) concept of epistemic
injustice. It is only through the systematic integration of these insights that it becomes
possible to gain unease as a heuristic tool for the philosophy of pragmatism as well as
for the concerns of feminism, and to transfer it to the manifold forms of discrimination
in our daily life. 
5 My argumentation is divided in two parts. In the first part, I present Charlotte Perkins
Gilman as a phenomenologist of unease. In my suggested reading of her literary works,
a dense description of unease comes into view, which reveals the mentioned features of
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unease. Two of her literary works seem particularly important to this approach. The
story The Yellow Wallpaper (1892) can be read as a dynamic of increasing unease which
ends in the erosion of epistemic authority. And the utopian novel Herland (1915) can be
received as a staging of the social conditions of increasing unease through fictional
inversion. She imagines a gynocentric normality in order to make normality visible and
the emergence of unease observable. 
6 In the second part a critical construction of unease as a feminist-pragmatist concept is
suggested.  Important  insights  into  the  social  conditions  of  unease,  which  Perkins
Gilman demonstrates in her work as a social theorist, such as The Man-Made World; or, 
Our Androcentric Culture (1911), are linked to the concepts of habit and quality in Dewey.
Through qualities (in the Deweyan sense),2 one can grasp the meaningfulness and the
affective coloring of a situation. This makes it  possible to differentiate conceptually
between situational and habitual unease and to relate them to each other.
 
1. What Uneasiness Feels Like
7 At  the  turn  of  the  19th  and  20th  centuries,  the  social  theorist  and  literary  figure
Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860-1935) searched for ways of articulation for the unease
induced by the structural domination between the two sexes. Her unconditional plea
for a primacy of practice suggests that she is a pragmatist thinker in a broad sense. This
includes her concept of Humanity in the making;  her commitment to a philosophy of
practice that does not prioritize the category of being over that of doing, but vice versa;
and the view that science is part of a democratic public. She understands her criticism
of gender structures and of an androcentric world as a quest for democratic habits. A
democracy must be a way of life and not just a political system. It is therefore necessary
to scan all areas of society in search for undemocratic conventions and to put them at
the center of criticism. A central object of her criticism is despotism in families. Perkins
Gilman describes the American-European nuclear family as a “proprietary family,” in
which  women  not  only  live  in  economic  dependence  on  men,  but  are  themselves
regarded as the property of  men:  “We live to-day in a democracy – the man-made
family is  a despotism.” (Perkins Gilman 1911:  40).  This critical  interest leads her to
analyze the interdependencies between economic structures, family dynamics, division
of labour, dress norms etc. and, especially in her literary work, to describe expressions
of habitualized unease of women. 
8 Charlotte Perkins Gilman was a highly ambivalent theorist.3 On the one hand, she was
an  inspiring  fighter  for  women’s  rights  using  the  means  of  speech,  literature,
journalism and critical analysis. On the other hand, in her fight for this goal all means
seem to be justified and she had a decidedly problematic preference for a population
policy instrument of eugenics in which women were to play a decisive role as a kind of
center for selection control.4 She is one of the many women in the so-called first wave
of the women’s movement, which does not address the structural similarities between
different forms of injustice and suppression, but rather plays them off against each
other. It is an important task of gender studies to analyze this problem in historically
detailed reconstruction.5 The recognition of  the structural  connections between the
axes of injustice is an important reason for the broad acceptance of “intersectionality”
in gender studies over the past 20 years.  Intersectional gender studies advocate the
analysis  of  the  interplay  between  different  forms  of  injustice.  Non-  or  even  anti-
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intersectional  feminist  analyses  are  certainly  not  convincing  today  as  theoretical
frameworks. However, I do not believe that this makes it impossible to benefit from
strong arguments and subtle insights. These must be contextualized and reframed in a
feminist  outline,  that  takes  responsibility  for  the  entanglement  between  different
forms of suppression in a more general perspective.
9 I  would  therefore  like  to  focus  on  one  dimension  of  Perkins  Gilmanʼs  work  as  a
systematic contribution to the feminist-pragmatist concept of unease. Indeed, in my
opinion,  one  source  of  the  enduring  inspiration  of  her  texts  lies  in  the  way  she
expresses and analyzes the unease of the women of her time. She builds up the term,
“androcentric world,” to explain the social conditions that make widespread unease
possible  and  sustain  it.  “Unease”  is  not  part  of  her  theoretical  vocabulary  (unlike
“androcentric,” “gynocentric”). However, the term can be used to grasp an important
dimension of her work, and it shows the richness of insights that can be gained for this
conception. 
10 Perkins Gilman, as a writer, social theorist and political activist,  uses three ways of
expressing the unease of women in her time and initiating change. At first she depicts
the dynamics of unease in literature, and second, as a social theorist, she analyzes the
structures that facilitate and stabilize it and designs other economic and social models.
Third, as an activist, she wants to open women’s eyes to their situation and show them
possibilities of change. The story The Yellow Wallpaper (1892) is particularly important
for exploring the appearances of habitual unease. Many of her literary texts are more
closely  tied  to  her  theoretical  analyses  and  models  and  partly  come  out  as  mere
applications of her theoretical ideas. One of her central interests is the analysis of the
economic structures for the material dependency of women on men and the demand
for economic independence. She realized this by the means of literature in What Diantha
Did (1909/10) and theoretically in the widely discussed study: Women and Economics: A
Study of the Economic Relation Between Men and Women as a Factor in Social Evolution (1898),
which was translated into seven languages. Another main emphasis of her work is the
critical  analysis  of  androcentric  reality,  a  reality  which  conflates  humanity  with
masculinity. In fiction, she dealt with this topic in the utopian novel Herland (1915).
There she sketches a gynocentric  utopia to make androcentric  normality appear ex
negativo. Her theoretical argument is developed in her book The Man-Made World; or, Our
Androcentric Culture (1911), in which she coined the term “androcentrism.” I refer to her
theoretical arguments in the second part of my paper. 
11 The best-known and aesthetically most convincing story is The Yellow Wallpaper (1892).
It provides also a rich source for the overt and subtle dynamics of gendered unease.
The short story is written from the perspective of a young woman who, in order to
alleviate her psychological suffering, has to submit under the medical prescription of a
rest cure on the countryside. She is told to dwell in the former childrenʼs room of a
rented house, which is furnished with yellow wallpaper. Her husband, who is also her
doctor, decrees fresh air and extensive rest in this room. The chosen passage is placed
at the beginning of the story. It opens up the unfolding interaction between the young
woman and the yellow wallpaper in the children’s room. For what remains to her in the
enforced lack of social and intellectual stimulation is the immersion in the abundant
design of the yellow wallpaper, which takes on step by step a life of its own. Through a
mixture of fascination and threat, this wallpaper’s life of its own gradually becomes the
world in which the young woman lives, thinks and feels. The end of the story is like a
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final  immersion  into  the  world  of  the  yellow  wallpaper,  which  means  from  the
husbandʼs perspective the wife going mad. The historical background for this story is
the  “rest  cure”  developed  by  the  specialist  for  nervous  diseases,  S. Weir  Mitchell
(1829-1914), in Philadelphia. Charlotte Perkins Gilman was subjected to this therapeutic
measure for “hysterical” (middle-class) women in the spring of 1887, which included
infantilization of the patients, bed rest, fatty food and prohibition of mental activity
such as reading.6 
12 I now turn to the text by Perkins Gilman and analyze it below from the perspective
indicated:
John is a physician, and perhaps – (I would not say it to a living soul, of course, but
this is dead paper and a great relief to my mind) – perhaps that is one reason I do
not get well faster. 
You see, he does not believe I am sick!
And what can one do?
If  a  physician  of  high  standing,  and  one’s  own  husband,  assures  friends  and
relatives that there is really nothing the matter with one but temporary nervous
depression – a slight hysterical tendency – what is one to do?
My brother is also a physician, and also of high standing, and he says the same
thing.
So I take phosphates or phosphites – whichever it is, and tonics, and journeys, and
air, and exercise, and am absoluteley forbidden to “work” until I am well again. 
Personally, I disagree with their ideas.
Personally, I believe that congenial work, with excitement and change, would do me
good.
But what is one to do?
I did write for a while in spite of them; but it does exhaust me a good deal – having
to be so sly about is, or else meet with heavy opposition. (Perkins Gilman 1999: 230)
13 To what extent is this passage an expression of unease? Unease is a diffuse sensation,
its  origins remain unclear or are so varied and diverse that they cannot be clearly
attributed. The sensation of unease includes being involved, entangled or even trapped
in dependencies and determinations, which can be felt on a subcutaneous level. Unease
has  an  evaluative  component,  something  is  felt  as  unpleasant,  as  oppressive  and
oppressing and somehow wrong. But the very structure and the conditions, that trigger
the  sensation  are  sustained  and  co-generated  by  oneʼs  own  behaviour  and  thus
somehow  accepted.  In  the  composition  of  the  passage,  this  is  emphasized  by  the
question, asked three times, “What can one do?,” or “What is one to do?”
14 The protagonist is not believed to be sick. It is a difficult communicative situation when
a personʼs state of mind or state of health is not believed by a counterpart. This creates
an asymmetrical  relation in  which the  person who is  not  believed is  forced into  a
defensive position. An imbalance of power emerges. If the person who has been put on
the defensive bears with this communicative asymmetry and thus also acknowledges it
in a certain way, unease arises.  Unease turns out to be a state of ambivalence. The
defensive  situation  oppresses  and  burdens  that  person,  but  the  moment  of
acknowledging this asymmetrical situation weakens the capacity to take an active role
and leads to resignation. It remains the rhetorical question: And what can one do?
15 Increasingly, the protagonist is confronted with two men of authority through their
function in the family (as husband and brother) and through their professional position
(both “highly  respected” doctors).  By virtue of  their  authority,  both give  the same
medical diagnosis by classifying and explaining the condition of the person as experts.
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Thus  the  situation  is  unambiguous  and  determined,  there  is  no  room  left  for
participation of a non-expert, even if the personʼs own condition and experience are
concerned. The protagonist is deprived of first-person-authority with respect to her
interior  life.  There  is  no  way  left  to  express  her  unease  in  the  language  of  men,
husbands,  male  relatives  and  doctors.  The  imbalance  of  power  becomes  an
impossibility of expression, a withdrawal of language and even of any kind of power.
The question comes out to touch a much more fundamental level of existence: “– what is
one to do?”
16 The next step of  aggravation consists  in the shaping of  conduct:  the prohibition of
certain activities, namely working, i.e. writing, reading, and the instruction of other
activities such as going for a walk, getting some fresh air. This is intended to eliminate
the possible sources or amplifiers of the imaginary illness, which is supposed to be any
kind of mental work like reading or writing. But as it is described here, mental work is
what the protagonist is interested in, what she regards as her talent and her mission.
Mental work would enable her to express herself. Instead of this, an imposed practice
of  distraction  should  take  place.  The  personal  “I”  of  the  protagonist  has  become
placeless, inactive, unrelated. She is urged to an inaudible protest: “Personally, I disagree
with their ideas.” The question is raised for a third time: “But what is one to do?”
17 The three-part structure performs the increasing unease. Unease emerges at first due
to the produced imbalance of power. Second, unease is intensified by the withdrawal of
first-person-authority. Third, unease reflects the restriction of any freedom to act. The
protagonist  suggests two ways of dealing with this.  One,  which she has abandoned,
consists in a combination of rebellion and secrecy. The associated effort to experience
rejection  and  open  criticism  or  to  develop  a  system  of  secrecy  proves  to  be
unsustainable. The other is to make the illness persist (“perhaps that is one reason I do
not get well faster”), which means a mixture of resistance and submission under the
regime of deprivation. Perkins Gilman pictures in the progress of the story a third way.
Unease becomes independent of shared reality. Step by step she withdraws from the
world in which she cannot express herself and is not understood. Instead she gives life
to  the  yellow  wallpaper,  immersing  herself  completely  in  the  interaction  with  the
yellow wallpaper. Her behaviour becomes incomprehensible to her social environment
and is regarded as going crazy. 
18 As  a  theorist,  Perkins  Gilmans  wants  to  show  that  these  dynamics  of  unease  are
generated and stabilized by the androcentric structure of our reality. “Androcentric” is
a world in which the masculine is  considered as general and is  made invisible as a
special gender amongst others. It is a consequence of such a structure that all those to
whom the masculine is not ascribed and who are therefore forced to see themselves as
deviating  from  the  norm  develop  a  disposition  to  the  feeling  of  unease.  For  the
asymmetry that characterizes this structure is an imbalance of power between two
unequal positions. One position is that of the standard, from which the other position
can be marked as gender. The marked position gets marked, but cannot mark for its
part.  This  structure  is  maintained  by  the  fact  that  both  positions  form  a  self-
understanding, a behaviour, a body scheme and an affectivity in accordance with the
ability to mark or to get marked. For those, who are at the position of getting marked,
the disposition to feel unease pervades these different modes. This disposition to feel
unease can manifest itself in many different ways and one can focus more on the social
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interactions, on the somatic level or on the psychic life. In The Yellow Wallpaper Perkins
Gilman emphasizes the latter and portrays a possible way of psychic decomposition. 
19 There  is  an  inherent  difficulty  in  making  androcentric  structures  and  their  effects
visible, since the accepted forms of articulation are designed from the perspective of
those whose gender is neutralized. How can one uncover the perspectivity of a claimed
neutrality, which is per definition a non-perspective, but rather the normal way to see
things?  Which  forms  of  articulation  are  comprehensible  and  can  be  connected  to
shared forms of life? Perkins Gilmanʼs novel Herland (1915) can be seen as an attempt to
uncover this logic of neutralization and generalization. She chooses an indirect way
and  sketches  the  fiction  of  a  gynocentric  world  in  order  to  show  the  functional
mechanisms of the androcentric one.  Herland can also be read as an utopian novel,
which seems like a simple reversal of gender power relations and an idealization of the
feminine. This is not my question here.
20 The plot of the story is the following: Three men are travelling with a mixture of the
spirit of adventure, of discovery and of conquest in little-known territories. More or
less  per accident they happen upon an area situated on a completely isolated high
plateau.  They  find  themselves  in  the  middle  of  a  civilization,  that  has  grown over
2000 years on its own, consisting only of women. New generations emerge through a
complex  process  of  unisex  reproduction (parthogenesis).  The three  men react  very
differently. The protagonist, named Van, from whose perspective the story is told, is
conceived  as  a  theoretical  mind.  He  looks  at  this  very  different  world  through
theoretical curiosity. He observes, asks questions and analyzes, and tries to understand
this world in contrast to his own. The invention of this figure turns the novel Herland
into a double-barreled narrative and theoretical text. The other two men are designed
contrapuntally:  Terry embodies the male conqueror,  who is  not willing and able to
engage in this world and in the end has to leave this world because of an outbreak of
violence.  Jeff  embodies  the  sensitive  artist  who,  full  of  admiration  for  this  world,
develops the desire to become part of it and stays ultimately there. 
21 I now quote a passage from the last third of the novel in which the protagonist Van
reflects on the structure and effect of this world: 
In missing men we three visitors had naturally missed the larger part of life, and
had unconsciously assumed that they must miss it too. It took me a long time to
realize – Terry never did realize – how little it meant to them. When we say men,
man,  manly,  manhood,  and  all  the  other  masculine  derivatives,  we  have  in  the
background of our minds a huge vague crowded picture of the world and all its
activities.  To grow up and “be a  man,”  to  “act  like  a  man” –  the meaning and
connotation is wide indeed. That vast background is full of marching columns of
men, of changing lines of men, of long processions of men; of men steering their
ships  into  new  seas,  exploring  unknown  mountains,  breaking  horses,  herding
cattle, ploughing and sowing and reaping, toiling at the forge and furnace, digging
in  the  mine,  building  roads  and  bridges  and high  cathedrals,  managing  great
businesses,  teaching  in  all  the  colleges,  preaching  in  all  the  churches;  of  men
everywhere, doing everything: “the world.”
And when we say Women, we think Female – the sex.
But to these women, in the unbroken sweep of this two-thousand-year-old feminine
civilization, the word woman called up all that big background, so far as they had
gone in social development; and the word man meant to them only male – the sex.
Of course we could tell them that in our world men did everything; but that did not
alter the background of their minds. That man, “the male,” did all these things was
to them a statement, making no more change in the point of view than was made in
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ours when we first faced the astounding fact – to us – that in Herland women were
“the world.”
We had been living there more than a year. We had learned their limited history,
with its straight, smooth, upreaching lines, reaching higher and going faster up to
the smooth comfort of their present life. We had learned a little of their psychology,
a much wider field than the history, but here we could not follow so readily. We
were now well used to seeing women not as females but as people; people of all
sorts, doing every kind of work. (Perkins Gilman 1999: 195)
22 What is “the world” in the protagonistʼs country of origin (in the novel the United
States of America at the beginning of the 20th century) is very different from what is
“the  world”  in  Herland.  The  world  is  shaped  through a  multitude  of  activities  like
certain  movements  of  bodies,  certain  designs  of  the  environment,  certain  ways  of
producing objects  and dealing with them, and certain models  of  the self.  One very
limited area of the world is connected with gender through specific functions. In the
world of the protagonist, these functions of the marked female gender are reproducing,
caring and pleasing. In the world of Herland, men are this gendered group to which he
himself belongs. He thus experiences for the first time this process of being special, of
standing out from the general, and can reflect on it from a gender perspective.
The  words  “male,”  “man”  have  a  background  of  many  activities.  These  words  are
virtually charged with these activities and get their semantic richness from them. The
spectrum of these activities is  very wide and outlines the whole area of public and
active  life  of  the  former  American  society,  like:  Marching,  driving  ships,  climbing
mountains,  taming  horses,  waging  war,  conquering,  cultivating  nature,  building,
trading, teaching, researching, making people believe – everything that generates a
world.  While  using the words “male,”  “man” this  plenitude of  images appears as  a
semantic horizon. These images are so manifold, that they represent nearly everything.
Masculinity  is  not  defined  by  gender-specific  characteristics,  such  as  strong,
courageous, but by activities that are world-productive. 
23 Perkins Gilman uses a kind of pragmatist theory of meaning here, according to which
linguistic meaning is built up from a background of activities and the history of these
activities. The meaning of the words “masculine,” “man” is determined by activities
that seem to be specific on the one hand, but on the other hand are self-generalizing,
self-confirming and self-entitling. By contrast, the meaning of the words “feminine”
and “woman” is determined primarily by the attribution to specific activities which are
guided be the functions for the “masculine general.”
24 The  protagonist  Van  realizes  this  in  his  attempt  to  understand  the  new  world  in
contrast to his familiar world: 
These women […] were strikingly deficient in what we call “femininity.” This led me
very promptly to the conviction that those “feminine charms” we are so fond of are
not feminine at all, but mere reflected masculinity – developed to please us because
they had to please us, and in no way essential to the real fulfillment of their great
process. (Perkins Gilman 1999: 104)
25 The  protagonist  recognizes  the  androcentric  structure  of  his  world,  its  realization
through conduct and activities and the meaning of the words male and female. Decisive
reason is the experience of the gynocentric world with its own long history and its own
habits  and  traditions.  This  history  of  activities  gives  the  words  their  (vague)
background. The meaning of words is not only formed by a long history of activities
and habits, but this history is the meaning of words in the form of a vague horizon.
Horizons are always broad and vague and never clearly defined because a (semantical)
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horizon  figures  as  background  against  which  individual  uses  of  words  can  be
understood. The androcentric structure is therefore also reflected in the meaning of
words. The horizon of the words “man” and “masculine” has been formed by a great
variety of world-producing activities. Words without a broad horizon of activity and
history, in contrast, are “flat” and reduced in their possible uses. 
If it becomes possible in Herland to regard women not as women but as human beings,
this is because of the diversity of the world-producing activities that women carry out.
Within the wide range of  activities  and interests,  the  activities  of  giving birth and
caring play a central role.7
26 In the novel, the character of the protagonist Van in Herland also reflects another form
of unease as the habitualized unease, which is well-developed in The Yellow Wallpaper
and analyzed in the reflective parts of Herland. Despite of his curiosity the protagonist
Van  experiences  unease  time  and  again.  The  character  Terry  judges  Herland
consistently  from the  usual  American  androcentric  structures  and  articulates  open
criticism and wants to offer resistance. In his opinion, gender relations like those in
Herland should not exist, they are abnormal. He makes a break for it and eventually
even uses violence by attempting rape. The character Jeff completely adapts to this
world. But the protagonist Van feels unease because his habitual “background of his
mind,” in which he holds a position of power by sex, comes into friction with a new
“background of his mind” in which he is deprived of it. His curiosity and interest in this
world leads him not to go into a counter-position and open criticism like Terry, but to
experience the friction of two irreconcilable worlds. Unease arises from a connection to
both, to a world in which he belongs to those who have the ability to mark others, as
well as to the world in which he belongs to the ones being marked. The sensation of
unease hardly appears in his attitude as a theorist, but rather in his interactions with
the citizens of Herland. It emerges especially in his sexual desires towards the woman
with whom he entered into a relationship towards the end of the story. Their practice
of sexuality, which has been created and cultivated through the 2000 year old way of
life of  unisex reproduction,  and its  effect in the newly entered relationship creates
unease despite all interest and theoretical recognition.
27 In my reading, the work of Perkins Gilman is a rich source for describing what unease
feels like. Moreover, her work can also been read as theorizing unease as a feminist-
pragmatist  concept.  In  the  next  section  I  would  like  to  differentiate  between  two
important  forms  of  unease  and  develop  their  conceptual  structure.  Gilman’s
descriptions  and  analyses  offer  many  clues  to  illuminate  both  forms,  habitualized
unease and situational unease, in their manifestations and conditions of origin. In the
following section I will therefore repeatedly refer back to Perkins Gilman.
 
2. Unease as a Critical Concept 
28 Both forms of unease, the habitualized and the situational unease, are not independent
of each other, because habitualized unease is also varied and maintained in situations.
In addition, there can be transitions between the internalization of inferiority, and the
diffuse evaluative feeling that something is wrong with the conditions and interactions
in a situation. In the former case the evaluative component of unease refers to the
person herself (in the sense of: something is wrong with me, I am not sufficent ). For
theorizing the concept of unease, therefore, a terminology is needed that takes into
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account both forms in their difference and in their possible transitions. In pragmatist
thinking two important concepts can be found for this purpose. Habitualized unease
can  be  defined  as  a  kind  of  habit  with  the  pragmatist  concept  of  habit.  And  the
situational unease can be analyzed with the pragmatic concept of qualities. Through
qualities the meaningfulness and the affective coloring of a situation are transmitted.
The literary and theoretical works of Perkins Gilman show the necessity of including a
power-critical and economic dimension. This brings into view the interaction between
social conditions and types of “uneasy” situations that take place again and again. 
29 The theorization, that will be presented in this section, is important in order to relate
the  concept  of  unease  to  other  forms  of  power  asymmetries  and  to  expand  the
exclusive  focus  on  gender  relations  that  Perkins  Gilman  undertakes.  Habitualized
unease is the consequence of every structure through which a normality and a marked,
subordinated other are generated. Habitualized unease is therefore also an important
factor in the critical analysis of racist societies.8 
30 Habits are social functions and not individual routines.9 Rather, habits develop from
interactions between a social as well as material environment and people. Dewey opens
his  study  Human  Nature  and  Conduct from  1922  with  the  section  “Habits  as  social
functions” and makes clear how the idea of interaction is to be sharpened. The social
and material environment includes systems of interrelations between individuals that
shape people’s needs and desires. Dewey mentions needs and desires such as demand
for food, for houses, for a mate, for some one to talk to and to listen to one talk, for
control of others. Customs regulate which types of needs are legitimate and which are
not; how needs can and cannot be satisfied with regard to which type of resources and
objects.  Dewey  holds  this  interweaving  of  sociality  and  materiality  as  “objective
conditions” to which habits always refer and relate. These objective conditions of the
environment are embodied in habits and act as predispositions to ways or modes of
response,  which  have  an  inherent  projective  force  of  habit.  Habits  are  therefore
characterized through a tendency to repeat, continue and preserve. Habits become so
naturally, a kind of second nature, that they act more like controlling and organizing
forces in the background. In this sense, habits always include a kind of mechanization
and automatization, almost by itself. As social functions, habits are results of complex
processes  of  mediation.  But  their  mode  of  action  is  immediate.  They  express
themselves  through intuitions,  instinctive  reactions and spontaneous feelings.  They
give  direction  to  behaviour  and  perception.  Habits  manifest  themselves  in  visible
actions,  but  also  in  some  subdued  subordinate  form.  The  latter  shows  up  in  self-
relations,  expectations,  affective  structures,  moods,  postures  and  body  sensations.
Habits are therefore omnipresent, sometimes more obvious, sometimes more covert.
They differ in this respect from dispositions that tend to make one think of something
potential  that  needs  actualization.  Habits  in  this  conception  are  in  a  double  sense
places  of  power  in  human  life  and  behaviour.  On  the  one  hand,  objective  power
structures  are  reflected in  habits,  on the  other  hand,  habits  have  an effect  on the
behaviour of  individuals  like  invisible  power and control  centers.  But  nevertheless,
habits are not deterministic, there remains a constitutive latitude for change. Dewey
therefore distinguishes two types of habits. The first is a type of habit with a strong
tendency  towards  self-sustaining  repetition.  This  type  of  habit  is  nearly  totally  a
mechanical routine. The second is a type of habit which remains open to change. Dewey
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calls these intelligent or artistic habits. Repetition and change do not form a contrast
here. 
31 Perkins Gilman provides an important theoretical contribution to habitualized unease
as a critical concept. In the following, I will therefore relate her analyses to Dewey’s
concept of habit and propose perspectives for generalization.
32 Habitualized  unease  or  unease  as  habit  is  a  social  function.  Therefore,  social  and
material conditions must be included, through which modes of action and reaction are
generated. Perkins Gilman draws attention to relationships of economic dependency
and  domination.  She  analyzes  their  effects  on  social  interaction  and  self-relations.
Economic dependencies are asymmetries of power and are reflected in political and
micropolitical structures and interactions, primarily between those who have power
over others and those over whom power is exercised. Perkins Gilman focuses on the
“proprietary family.” It is the institutionalization of economic dependencies between
genders and generations and is maintained through appropriate habits.10 There are on
the one hand those who provide the material basis, who do paid work and thus earn the
money that gives the whole family housing, food, participation in cultural life. They
form a different habit than those on the other hand, whose material existence depends
on someone else. Due to the material superiority the first hold entitlements towards
the persons dependent on them. These entitlements have the character of property
relations.
33 This  is  exactly  what  Perkins  Gilman  wants  to  express  with  her  term  “proprietary
family.” In these families,  women and children are regarded as the property of the
men, and the manners of interaction are shaped precisely by this. Perkins Gilman is
concerned to  make clear  the  political  impact  and the  social  consequences  of  these
habits,  which  counteract  a  democratic  form  of  government.  Societies  that  adopt  a
democratic form of government must have an interest in the formation of democratic
habits. Understanding democracy as a way of life also includes the habits in families.
She writes: 
For each man to have one whole woman to cook for and wait upon him is a poor
education for democracy. The boy with a servile mother, the man with a servile
wife,  cannot  reach  the  sense  of  equal  rights  we  need  to-day.  Too  constant
consideration of the master’s tastes makes the master selfish; and the assault upon
his heart direct, or through that proverbial side-avenue, the stomach, which the
dependent woman needs must make when she wants anything, is bad for the man,
as well as for her. (Perkins Gilman 1911: 42-3)
34 Perkins  Gilman  contrasts  this  plea  for  democratic  habits  with  the  reality  of  the
“proprietary family” and points to the activities and habits associated with it. What
kind of habit is formed by the activities of cooking and waiting under these conditions?
To be economically dependent means that someone else controls the conditions for
one’s own existence. The economically dependent person must fulfill the entitlements
by services, which can be demanded and valued. This gives rise to the hidden threat,
that the material basis can be withdrawn at will. Therefore, the dependent person not
only fulfills the requirements, but does so in a way that makes the withdrawal of the
conditions of existence as unlikely as possible. This leads to a servile attitude and to an
overfulfillment  of  the  required  activities.  One  classical  strategy  for  developing  an
irreplaceable bonding is the activity of cooking in accordance with special requests.
This deepens the feeling of power and strength of the dominant person. The activity of
waiting means to be completely attuned to the other person. The dominant person
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experiences himself as the center of attention. This leads to a feeling of superiority and
self-centredness, which is contrary to a democratic habit. 
35 This dependent, subjugating form of existence generates unease in two respects. First,
being existentially dependent is connected with unease. Second, unease emerges due to
the more latently or more explicitly felt threat that the conditions of existence can be
withdrawn  because  of  dissatisfaction  or  because  of  pure  despotism.  This  unease
becomes  a  habit  and  is  embodied  in  servile,  waiting  bodies  to  which  timidity  and
inhibition are inscribed. The somatic expressions of habitualized unease also include
the  somatic  pattern  of  occupying  as  little  space  as  possible,  as  well  as  taking  into
account subtle or even open violence.11 
36 As  habit,  habitualized  unease  also  has  a  self-sustaining,  projective  force.  The
habitualized  unease  becomes  part  of  the  self-understanding  and  has  an  effect  on
actions,  thinking,  feeling  and  desire.  This  is  the  reason  for  the  recognition  of  the
structures that create unease. Habitualized unease therefore refers to a social position
of involvement in the conditions that generate unease. The means needed for critical
analysis,  like  reflective  distance  and  modes  of  articulation  are  missing.  Critical
expression  can  develop  through  an  impulse  from  outside  or  through  a  serious
deterioration. Habits of unease may become intelligent,  artistic habits that are self-
reflexive and open to change. But habits of unease may also freeze into a routine. There
seems to be no alternative, no latitude.12 
37 This structure of the family with its property relations is in turn made possible and
supported  by  an  androcentric  reality  in  which  the  masculine  is  the  norm  and
everything is related to it and designed by it. In an androcentric world, humanity is
identified with masculinity and other genders are marked in their function to stabilize
the “human-male.”13 The claim to  expression and ownership emerges.  Shaping and
interpreting  the  world  co-produces  a  proprietary  relation  to  the  world.  The
“proprietary family” is therefore an institution of this androcentric reality.
38 In her literary work, Perkins Gilman sketches paradigmatic situations facilitated by the
androcentric reality and the “proprietary family.” Three types of situations have been
analyzed in the first part of this article. The passage of The Yellow Wallpaper shows, how
the  credibility  and  the  self-expression  of  a  dependent  person  can  be  undermined.
Fiction  makes  obvious  the  immediate  effects  of  habitualized  unease  mediated  by
androcentric and family structures. 
39 Often, social theoretical or philosophical analysis do not reach this level of concrete
precision. The double-barreled theoretical and literary self-understanding of Perkins
Gilman  is  a  strong  inspiration  for  critical  feminist  theory  –  with  the  limitations
mentioned above. Moreover, Perkins Gilmans contribution consists in the systematic
connection between her ontological analysis (reality is androcentric), always including
power-dynamics, the analysis of institutions (such as the institution of the family) and
types  of  situations.  Perkins  Gilman’s  insights  in  the  phenomenon  of  habitualized
unease in relation to gender can be profitably developed further for a more general
critical  conception  of  habitualized  unease.  This  reveals  a  number  of  important
references to other theoretical lines. Two of these are briefly presented here.
40 The  much-discussed  2007  study  by  Miranda  Fricker,  Epistemic  injustice can  help  to
understand  forms  of  missing  credibility  and  lack  of  modes  to  express  oneself  as
dimensions of injustice. Fricker examines the basic knowledge-producing practice of
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communicating one’s own experiences to others. This practice, which is indispensable
in everyday life, is in danger of being blocked by two forms of injustice, which Fricker
calls testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice refers to the
phenomenon  of  giving  limited  or  no  credibility  to  someone,  based  on  prejudice.
Fricker’s examples are prejudices against women and against blacks. Women or blacks
are given limited or no credibility in communicating certain experiences because they
are women or blacks. This analysis can help to understand, why certain articulations of
unease are not listened to and did not become theory-productive. Fricker describes as
hermeneutical  injustice the  much  more  far-reaching  phenomenon  that  certain
experiences cannot be communicated and understood at all because the social patterns
of interpretation are lacking. As an example, Fricker cites the interpretation pattern of
sexual harassment. Before its social acceptance, women could hardly or not express
certain experiences and could not make their injuries understandable.  This concept
helps to see, why unease remains often diffuse and cannot be articulated at all. In this
case, other habits block the conditions of articulation.
41 Another obvious connection for the deepening and expansion of the idea of “unease as
habit” is  Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus.  Like the pragmatist concept of habit,
Bourdieu’s  habitus functions  as  a  mediation  concept,  not  between  individual  and
environment  in  general,  but  between  individual  and  society.  While  the  pragmatist
concept  of  habit  is  developed  more  in  a  context  of  theory  of  action  (especially  in
Dewey), Bourdieu’s concept of habitus belongs in a sociological context, both concepts
refer to a theory of praxis. Habitus reproduces social order and becomes permanent, i.e.
temporally stable and transferable. The concept of habitus can refer to social patterns
of order (e.g. the habitus of a social class) as well as to actors. In the detailed study
Distinction.  A  Social  Critique  of  the  Judgement  of  Taste (1984),  Bourdieu  examines  the
distinguishing power of  the habitus of  different classes in society.  And in the study
Masculine  Domination,  feelings  of  unease  are  inscribed  in  a  gender-specific  female
habitus.14 In contrast to the sociological concept of habitus, the concept of habit is on the
one hand not limited to social classifications such as gender or class, although these
play a central role, as shown. The more flexible concept of habit, on the other hand, can
be  used  to  adopt  perspectives  on  various  social  dependencies.  Another  important
difference is that the pragmatist concept of habit systematically links the dimension of
reproducing  social  order  with  the  dimension  of  change  by  distinguishing  between
habits as routines and intelligent (artistic) habits.15
42 Habits  are  mediated  as  social  functions  and  habits  have  an  immediate  effect  in
situations.  Unease as  habit  has  a  situational  dimension,  habitualized unease in  this
sense is also situational unease, in its immediate appearance. This is a first meaning of
situational unease. 
43 Second,  unease  can also  arise  in  situations  where  a  routine  habit  is  disturbed.16 In
Perkins Gilmanʼs novel  Herland,  the protagonist  Van experiences unease despite his
theoretical interest. His unease emerges when his habits in dealing with women and
the deviating habits in Herland are clashing against each other.  Unease can arise in
dealing  with  otherness.  Some  people  feel  unease  when  they  enter  a  foreign
environment, some react with unease to smells they do not know, to behaviour and
sounds. Then unease can manifest itself somatically like a feeling of being disturbed, of
wanting  to  turn  away,  as  if  the  internalized  good  taste  is  violated.  Such  unease
stabilizes  conventions.  Situational  unease caused by disturbed routines  can liberate
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restorative energies. Like unease as a mechanical routine, it is an important form of
experience that endangers living democracies and therefore needs to be recognized,
described, analyzed and criticized. 
44 Third, through situational unease one can also grasp a quality in situations that does
not, or only in the background, refer to habitualized unease or to disturbed routines.
We can experience unease, for example, if we have the impression that someone has
been treated very subtly unfairly in a situation. But such unease is not yet a “sense of
injustice.”17 The experience of unease is more diffuse, vague and morally open than the
sense of injustice. It is first of all like a voice that speaks out and tells us: “Something is
wrong. You have to find out whether it has to do with you or the circumstances. You
have to find out if you donʼt want to allow something new or if you are suffering from
something that is problematic, that should be changed.”
45 In the following, however, I would only like to deal with one common feature of these
three  types  of  situational unease,  namely  their  appearance  of  immediacy.  Here,
“immediacy” does not mean something personally authentic, but rather the grasping of
the quality of a situation as, for example, ceremonial, dramatic, tense, released – or even
uneasy. In his essay Qualitative Thought (1930), Dewey defines qualities not as properties,
but  as  that  which  distinguishes  one  situation  from  others,  which  pervades  every
associated  detail  and  gives  them  significance.18 Such  pervasive  qualities  have  a
direction of transition that evokes articulations, for example in the form of actions or
thoughts. Qualities thus “are” something in situations themselves and not projections
from the subjectʼs perspective.19 This does not mean that all  persons involved must
experience  situations  in  the  same  way.  Qualities  have  the  function  of  grasping
situations as a whole and orienting our actions accordingly. Qualities enable an overall
impression, which is not, however, made up of distinct, specifiable individual parts, but
of small aspects that cannot be disentangled. Also the grasping subject merges with this
holistic, atmospheric quality and is an immanent part of it. Qualities are of the utmost
importance for our understanding and actions and must be given an appropriate place
in every theorization.20 Yet it is very difficult to determine them precisely in theory.
Qualitative  experiencing  is  characterized  by an  indeterminacy  and  vagueness  that
disappears in conceptualization. Dewey describes qualitative experiencing as a medium
where distinctions such as those between active and passive, subjective and objective
are undermined.
46 Unease  or uneasiness  as  qualities  differ  from  other  qualities  such  as  ceremonial, 
dramatic, tense, released by its negative form: un-ease. Unease has a diffuse evaluative
dimension.  Unease  is  something  unpleasant,  perhaps  irritating,  oppressive,
threatening. But it is not clearly defined as negative, it remains not clearly attributable
to someone or something. Perkins Gilman describes the quality of the whole situation
in The Yellow Wallpaper as increasingly uneasy. This holds for the passage interpreted as
for the story as a whole. In the story, the process of spreading is unfolded until those,
like the husband, who want to maintain their position of sovereignty until the very
end, are also involved into this unease. The Yellow Wallpaper was interpreted by some as
a ghost story. In this perspective, the pervasive quality in the overall situation should
be  described  as  “horrific.”21 I  rather suggest  to  read  the  story  differently.  Perkins
Gilman uses the means of fiction, to show how a womanʼs habitualized unease pervades
an overall situation and becomes quasi-autonomous. 
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47 I  would like to conclude with a few remarks about the relevance of the concept of
unease to democracy as a way of  life.  Democracies as a way of  life  should have an
interest in developing an “uneasy-reflexive” democratic practice. I would like to relate
this to habitualized unease and to one type of situational unease.
48 In this article,  especially the habitualized unease is  developed on concrete material
which deals with the category of gender. At the same time, I have established a more
general perspective of analysis. Habitualized unease can be related to all structures of
normalization which disguise their particularity. Habitualized unease is characterized
by  including  oneʼs  own  marginalization  and  inferiorization  in  oneʼs  own  self-
understanding and thus recognizing it. Habitualized unease is therefore not a form of
inhibition of articulation that could be resolved by friendly invitation. Here, too, the
various  waves  of  feminism  can  exemplify  the  long,  unfinished  path  of  generating
attention, inventing new forms of articulation and forming political forces, through
which long habitualized unease becomes reflexive and changeable.  But processes of
resolving and dissolving of habitualized unease also lead very often to the formation of
something like a “counter-unease.” This may be generated for those whose routine
habit is disturbed. This phenomenon was mentioned above as a type of situational
unease  that  can  mobilize  immense  political  (counter)forces.  Unease  is  a  powerful
sensation in the public and in the so-called private sphere. Therefore, it is in the very
interest of a democracy as a way of life to further develop the phenomenology and
theory of unease.
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NOTES
1. Charlene Haddock Seigfried in particular has reappropriated a historical line of pragmatist
feminism and used the work of thinkers such as Ella Lyman Cabot, Jane Addams and Charlotte
Perkins Gilman as a source of feminist analysis. Cf. Haddock Seigfried (1996; 1993; 1991a; 1991b);
see her essay on Charlotte Perkins Gilman (Haddock Seigfried 2001).
2. Cf. Dewey (1929-1930).
3. Cf. on person and work: Davis (2010), Hill (1980), Lane (1990).
4. She  developed  a  peculiar  form  of  argument  using  social  Darwinism,  which  is  primarily
intended  to  support  her  conception  of  gender  and  humanity.  She  argues  that  it  would  be
functional for the further development of human beings if women were to make the choice to
form a  reproductive  community,  as  is  often  the  case  in  the  animal  kingdom,  and  not  men.
Therefore, the practices of dressing up and making oneself beautiful and competing with people
of the same sex should actually be male practices. Women have to be the selective forces and
should figure as representatives of the race-type and must bear the actual evolutionary task.
Gilman attributes this idea, which she finds immensely fascinating, to the sociologist Lester F.
Ward and his “gynocentric theory of life,” to whom she dedicates the study The Man-Made World;
or, Our Androcentric Culture. Cf. the critical analysis: Allen (2004), Davis (2003). 
5. Cf. to this Newman (1999).
6. Cf. to this Allen (2009). 
7. At many points in the novel, motherhood serves as a substitute for religion. 
8. This is expressed very concisely right at the beginning of Stuart Hall’s biographical reflection:
“These changes didn’t magically resolve the unease which had been incubated as I grew up in a
racially subordinate position in colonial Jamaica.” (Hall 2017: 3). 
9. Charles  Sanders  Peirce  introduces  the  term “habit”  into  the  discussion with  reference  to
scholastic texts. Habit is an important term for most pragmatist approaches. In the following, I
refer mainly to Dewey (1922). 
10. I am referring to Perkins Gilman (1898; and 1911).
11. The embodiment of habitualized unease is a very important level which must be described in
detail following the investigations of theoreticians such as Iris Marion Young or Sara Ahmed.
Young has analyzed feminine self-limitation with the means of phenomenology as “inhibited
intentionality.” In her classic and still groundbreaking study “Throwing Like a Girl,” Young uses
the example of throwing to show how girls learn not to execute the movement of throwing with
their  whole  body.  Ahmed  describes  the  physical  effect  of  the  expectation  of  violence:  “The
violence does things. You begin to expect it. You learn to inhabit your body differently through
this expectation. When you sense the world out there as a danger, it is your relation to your own
body that changes: you become more cautious, timid. […] Girls come to take up less space by what
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they do, and by what they do not do. Girls come to restrict themselves through restricting how
they use their bodies.” (Ahmed 2017: 41).
12. Perkins Gilman writes about the conditions of the proprietary family: “We are so accustomed
to this relation; have held it for so long to be the natural relation, that it is difficult indeed to
show it to be distinctly unnatural and injurious.” (Perkins Gilman 1911: 36). And: “But it is no
swift  and easy  matter  to  disabuse  the  race  mind from attitudes  and habits  inculcated  for  a
thousand years. What we have been fed upon so long we are well used to, what we are used to we
like, what we like we think is good and proper.” (Ibid.: 103).
13. Cf. Perkins Gilman’s equation: “‘mankind’ meant men-kind.” (Perkins Gilman 1911: 18).
14. For Bourdieu, this follows from the determination of the female being as being-perceived.
E.g.: “The probability of experiencing the body with embarrassment (the form par excellence of
the experience of the ‘alienated body’), malaise, timidity or shame rises with the discrepancy
between the socially demanded body and the practical relation to the body that is imposed by the
gazes and reactions of others. It varies very strongly according to sex and position in the social
space.” (Bourdieu 2001: 65).
15. The considerations of Félix Ravaisson could be connected to this dimension of changeability
and creativity of habit, see e.g. Grosz (2013); on the relationship between habitus and habit see
also Crossley (2013).
16. Cf. “A habit, a routine habit, when interfered with generates uneasiness, sets up a protest in
favor of  restoration and a  sense of  need of  some expiatory act,  or  else  it  goes  off  in  casual
reminiscence.” (Dewey 1922: 54).
17. This term is developed by Shklar (1990).
18. Dewey (1929-1930). In the fourth chapter of Logic: The Theory of Inquiry Dewey elaborated this
idea and its function for the initiation and control of research processes. Cf. Dewey (1938: 66-85),
cf. also my paper: Wille (2017).
19. “[I]t  is  to be remarked that a situation is  a whole in virtue of  its  immediately pervasive
quality. When we describe it from the psychological side, we have to say that the situation as a
qualitative whole is sensed or felt. […] Stating that it is felt is wholly misleading if it gives the
impression that the situation is a feeling or an emotion or anything mentalistic. On the contrary,
feeling, sensation and emotion have themselves to be identified and described in terms of the
immediate  presence  of  a  total  qualitative  situation.  […]  A  universe  of  experience  is  the
precondition of a universe of discourse.” (Dewey 1938: 73-4).
20. “[T]he  immediate  existence  of  quality,  and  of  dominant  and  pervasive  quality,  is  the
background, the point of departure, and the regulative principle of all thinking. Thought which
denies the existential reality of qualitative things is therefore bound to end in self-contradiction
and in denying itself.” (Dewey 1929-1930: 261).
21. Cf. Lovecraft (2000 [1927]).
ABSTRACTS
In this article I pursue both a systematic and a historical interest. I develop the sentiment of
unease as a feminist-pragmatist concept systematically. The main references are the terms habit
and situation in John Dewey and the work of Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Perkins Gilman reflects
experiences  of  unease  as  a  writer  and  as  a  (social)  theorist.  The  paper  is  therefore  also  a
historical appreciation of the theoretical work of Charlotte Perkins Gilman. With Perkins Gilman,
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uneasiness appears to be an expression of an androcentric world, more generally speaking, of a
world  in  which  gender  relations  are  understood  according  to  the  pattern  of  normality  and
deviation.  This  can be generalized and unease can be understood as an expression of  power
asymmetries that damage the epistemic authority of some. Such a view is critical of a widespread
tendency  to  individualize  negative  feelings  and  attribute  them to  individuals,  who  are  then
classified either as in need of  individual  coaching or as pathological,  and who can therefore
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